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Abstract
We study the effect of a state level mandate on renewable heating technologies
on the housing market. The mandate requires a minimum share of 10 % renewable
energy sources when changing the heating system in the existing building stock.
As renewable energy sources are still more expensive than conventional alternatives
this mandate could lower the relative price of homes in the existing building stock
when a replacement of the heating system is impending. We implement a two stage
difference-in-differences nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the effect on
prices taking advantage of differences in regulation by location and vintage of the
building stock. Our results find no evidence of an effect of the mandate on housing
prices.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the biggest challenge currently faced by the world’s policy
makers. It requires massive changes in the way energy is generated and consumed
across the board. Several countries have ambitious targets and policies in place to
shape the transition towards a low carbon society. The energy transition in Germany
is a prime example with its demanding targets for German energy policy. One of the
serious challenges in Germany and many other countries concerns residential heating. In
Germany residential heating accounts for more than 20 % of final energy consumption
and energy used for heating is only weakly linked with power generation (BMWi, 2017).
The need for a heating transition in addition to a power transition is apparent. Recent
years have seen some progress being made and the current share of renewable energy
source in heating is close to the target of 14 % at the federal level. However, renewable
energy sources are predominantly used in housing built after 2009 and less so in the
older housing stock, which makes up the vast majority of residential homes in Germany.
This paper studies the impacts of a state mandate directed at increasing the share of
renewable energy sources used in the older building stock on the housing market.
Federal regulation for heating in Germany comes mainly in the form of building
codes which apply to new construction, including a federal mandate on renewable heat-
ing technologies. Raising the rate at which refurbishments occur and making the existing
building stock more energy efficient has long been a priority. The main federal tools are
subsidy schemes such as the Market Incentive Program (Marktanreizprogramm) for heat-
ing technologies based on renewable energy sources and the subsidized loans offered by
the government-owned development bank KfW (Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau). In ad-
dition to these measures, the federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg introduced a state
law mandating the use of renewable energy sources in the existing building stock when
exchanging the heating system. Repeated discussions to extend the state law to cover all
of Germany point to the relevance of evaluating the policy. The Baden-Wuerttemberg
state mandate on renewable heating technologies increases the costs of retrofitting exist-
ing homes by mandating use of renewable heating technologies or the implementation of
other compliance options, such as superior insulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
associated with the existing building stock.1 At least two effects on the housing market
of introducing such a mandate are conceivable: 1) Retrofitting activity could decline in
response to an increase in costs as more homeowners decide to repair an existing heating
system rather than replace it. This could in the future lead to a lower quality of the
existing housing stock than would otherwise have been the case, and consequently, to
lower prices. 2) The expected compliance cost could capitalize into property prices. Such
capitalization should reflect the perceived extra cost induced by the mandate and the
(subjective) probability of a heating system failure making a retrofitting necessary and
1Germeshausen et al. (2017) study the effect of the same state mandate on the uptake of renewable
heating technologies and find little evidence that homeowners have complied by installing more renewable
heating technologies.
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provides an indication of the perceived financial burden associated with the mandate.
Unfortunately, there is no micro data available on retrofitting activity in Germany and
we cannot assess this dimension directly. However, capitalization of retrofitting cost into
housing prices for existing homes with pre-installed heating systems can be assessed us-
ing available housing market data. We ask the question whether the state mandate had
an impact on housing prices of affected homes. We construct a research design based on
the spatial discontinuity at the state border as well as the variation in applicability of the
mandate by building vintage. Specifically, we estimate a spatial difference-in-differences
model comparing the prices of old and new houses for sale within and outside of Baden-
Wuerttemberg. This design allows us to identify effects on the prices of houses for sale
in the existing building stock in Baden-Wuerttemberg.
Our findings reveal no evidence of statistically significant capitalization in the housing
market. Possible explanations for this result include the availability of relatively low
cost measures to comply with the state mandate (such as using bio-oil or bio-gas in
conventional fossil fuel heating systems). It may be that the cost of complying using
these measures is sufficiently low, that they are dwarfed by other expenditures associated
with retrofitting. Alternatively, the salience of the regulation may be low among sellers
(or they may perceive it as low among buyers) resulting in a failure to incorporate such
capitalization in their asking prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short
review of the related literature and Section 3 describes the background on building
and renewable heating regulation in Germany. Section 4 presents the underlying data.
Section 5 explains our empirical strategy. The results are shown in Section 6. Section 7
discusses our findings, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper contributes to the growing literature addressing rationality of homeowners
and saliency of energy costs related to space heating. Past research has found that energy
costs are salient to home buyers. For example, several studies from a variety of countries
show that homes with energy labels certifying them as relatively efficient sell at a price
premium (see e.g. Eichholtz et al., 2010; Brounen and Kok, 2011; Hyland et al., 2013).
Myers (forthcoming) uses variation in fuel prices in Massachusetts, USA, to investigate
their impact on the housing market. She finds that effects on house (transaction) prices
are consistent with full capitalisation of future energy cost.
For Germany, evidence has been found that mandatory disclosure of energy use
information in the shape of energy performance certificates reduces asking prices of the
relatively energy inefficient houses. The study by Frondel et al. (2018) focuses on the
period 2013 to 2015 and examines the introduction of mandatory energy performance
certificates in May 2014. They hypothesize that particularly sellers of less efficient houses
would be reluctant to reveal accurate information on energy performance in the absence
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of mandatory disclosure. Their findings support this hypothesis. The introduction of
mandatory energy performance disclosure causes asking prices to decline by up to 11 %
for those sellers who would not otherwise have disclosed energy performance information.
Distinguishing between building vintage, the effect is found to be insignificant for houses
built in 2002 or later and increase with age for houses built prior to that (almost 4 %
for homes built between 1977 and 2002 and almost 10 % for homes built prior to 1977).
Our study is also relevant to the emerging literature on the effect of building energy
codes on energy consumption and home values. Bruegge et al. (2019) study the ef-
fectiveness and distributional impacts of building energy standards in California, USA.
By exploiting spatial and temporal variation in the stringency of California’s building
energy standards they identify the effectiveness of building energy codes in reducing
energy use and the effects of varying levels of stringency on the prices and characteris-
tics of homes. They find that stricter energy codes reduce the size and the number of
bedrooms primarily in homes occupied by low-income households by 4-6 %. They also
find that building code stringency capitalises into housing prices and increases dispersion
across income quintiles. For low-income households, stricter energy building codes lower
prices by some 8-12 % whereas for higher income households prices increase by 2 % on
average. The authors conclude that these effects on prices are inadequately explained
by the changes in observable housing characteristics which suggests that unobservable
characteristics change as well in response to the stringency of the building energy codes.
In contrast to existing studies, our paper addresses the effect of a mandate on tech-
nology choice when retrofitting existing homes. Almost all building energy codes focus
only on construction of new homes neglecting the vast majority of houses in the existing
housing stock. Our research design is similar to that of Bruegge et al. (2019), but in
contrast to their study, the main characteristics of the houses subjected to the mandate
on renewable heating are fixed and cannot be adjusted in response. Germeshausen et
al. (2017) study the effect of the same state mandate on the uptake of renewable heat-
ing technologies. They find no evidence that the state mandate has induced additional
uptake of renewable heating technologies such as solar thermal collectors or biomass
furnaces. However, alternative compliance measures involving insulation or the use of
bio-oil or bio-gas also come with additional costs in comparison to the status quo and
may capitalize into housing prices.
3 Background
3.1 Building energy codes in Germany
Germany has had building energy codes regulating the thermal insulation of buildings
since 1977 and energy efficiency requirements on newly installed and existing heating
systems since 1978. Amendments have increased the stringency of these requirements
at regular intervals. The Energy Savings Ordinance (Energieeinsparverordnung, EnEv)
introduced in 2002, regulates the annual primary energy requirement of newly con-
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structed and renovated buildings. The energy performance standards in the Energy
Savings Ordinance have since become increasingly stringent in a series of amendments.
Approximately two thirds of the residential buildings in Germany were built prior to
1979 according to ARGE (2016). However, energy retrofitting has been carried out for
the large majority of these homes. Popular energy efficiency measures include improved
efficiency of heating systems, as well as window and to a lesser degree roof insulation.
Our empirical strategy focuses on comparing homes for sale in Baden-Wuerttemberg
to those in the three neighboring states: Hesse, Bavaria and the Rheinland-Palatinate.
There is some variation in energy efficiency of housing across states. In 2012 the energy
use intensity for a single or two-family house in Baden-Wuerttemberg was 161.7 kilowatt
hour (kWh) per square meter (sqm) in comparison to 180.6 kWh per sqm in Hesse, 157.2
kWh per sqm in Bavaria and 170.6 kWh per sqm in the Rhineland-Palatinate (Walberg,
2012).
3.2 Renewable energy in space heating
The German Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWaermeG) is a federal law mandating
a minimum share of renewable energy sources for all new buildings with a building
permit granted after 1 January 2009 when it entered into force. The federal law aims to
increase the share of renewable energy sources in heating to 14 % by 2020. It mandates
a minimum share of renewable energy use in space heating. The exact share depends on
the technology employed (e.g. 15 % for solar thermal collectors, 50 % for biomass or a
heat pump, and 30 % for bio-gas). Alternative measures of compliance include exceeding
the energy efficiency requirements in the Energy Savings Ordinance to degrees specified
in the law.
The federal law on renewable energy sources in space heating partly replaces a Baden-
Wuerttemberg specific law introduced in 2008. In contrast to the federal law however,
the state mandate addresses both new and existing buildings. The Baden-Wuerttemberg
state mandate (EWaermeG) requires a minimum share of renewable energy use in space
heating of at least 10 % when replacing the heating system in the existing building
stock for residential use. It exists only in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg where it was
introduced in 2008 with effect from 2010 for existing homes. Compensating measures
are similar to those allowed in the federal law for new buildings. The state mandate was
amended in 2015 with stricter requirements (now 15 %) but more lenient compliance
measures (e.g. producing a refurbishment plan is equivalent to 5 % renewables in energy
use regardless whether the identified measures in this plan are implemented). There is a
fine for non-compliance of up to 100,000 Euro. The law is enforced by the local building
authorities at the municipal level.
Renewable heating technologies are generally more expensive than conventional heat-
ing with the cheapest option on the market in the period being natural gas. The net
present value (NPV) of the difference in costs amounts to between 9,000 and 11,000 Euro
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when comparing natural gas and the cheapest renewable technology.2 This calculation
assumes a life time of 18 years for an installation and a discount rate of 4.5 %. Other
compliance options such as e.g. facade insulation are much more expensive. The cheap-
est alternative by far is to use conventional fuels with a minimum share of bio-oil (NPV
cost difference between 3,000 and 13,000 Euro over 18 years) or bio-gas (NPV cost differ-
ence of 2,000 to 5,000 Euro over 18 years) assuming the old heating system is replaced
with a newer system with the same fuel type.3 While only about 31 % of buildings
used for housing in Baden-Wuerttemberg heat with gas according to BDEW (2015b),
changing the heating system from oil to gas would involve additional one-time costs
of between 3,000 and 8,000 Euro. The 2018 evaluation of the state mandate commis-
sioned by the Ministry of the Environment, Climate Protection and the Energy Sector
Baden-Wuerttemberg (Pehnt et al., 2018) considers the compliance methods chosen as
reported by the local building authorities: In 2010, renewable energy technologies (solar
thermal collectors, biomass or heat pumps) were used in approximately 52 % of the cases
with solar thermal installations accounting for roughly 30 % of the cases alone. Heating
with bio-oil or bio-gas was used in 23 % of the cases, and alternative measures (e.g.
insulation) were used in 16 % of the cases. However, the use of bio-oil and bio-gas has
been increasing over time. In 2015 prior to the amendment taking effect, compliance
through bio-oil or bio-gas accounted for 46 % of the cases and the share for renewable
energy technologies dropped to 34 %, with alternative measures at 12 %. Over the whole
period the share of cases exempt from the mandate due to infeasibility remains stable
at 8-9 %. The state mandate has also been accused of causing a decline in the state’s
rate of refurbishment. Although micro data to study this potential effect is not available
(UM, 2011), Germeshausen et al. (2017) investigate aggregate data and find suggestive
evidence that the replacement rate of heating systems in Baden-Wuerttemberg is lower
than expected after the introduction of the mandate.
As the state mandate comes into effect when a heating system is replaced an im-
pact on housing prices would depend on the (discounted) extra cost of complying with
the mandate as well as the perceived likelihood of having to replace the heating sys-
tem within the ownership period. There are subsidy schemes at the federal level for
investments in residential space heating. The investment cost subsidies for renewable
heating technologies from the Market Incentive Program (Marktanreizprogramm) vary
by technology and mostly lie in the region 9-11 % of the investment cost. The effect
of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state mandate on uptake of this subsidy scheme is studied
in Germeshausen et al. (2017). The German KfW(Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau) also
provides investment cost subsidies and subsidized loans for retrofitting of existing homes
(e.g. “Energieeffizient Sanieren” product numbers 151 and 430 ). These cover between
2We have calculated these values using data described in Germeshausen et al. (2017).
3These costs are estimated as in Germeshausen et al. (2017) based on the heating energy demand for
an example house described in the evaluations of the subsidy scheme for renewable heating technologies.
We use 2019 information on the price of bio-oil and biogas both of which were approximately 10% more
expensive than conventional oil and gas.
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10 and 30 % of the investment cost though maximum 30,000 Euro per unit of housing,
but come with strict minimum requirements on the level of energy efficiency attained.
4 Data
The state-specific regulation and the regional nature of housing markets make an empir-
ical strategy based on comparing housing prices along the state border a natural choice.
We make use of several data sets for the analysis. The primary data set is the data
on housing prices provided by Empirica GmbH. This data consists of characteristics
and asking prices for individual homes offered for sale through real estate websites. We
merge the housing market data with data on regional socio-economic indicators from
the INKAR data set and data on the real estate tax factor determining the municipal
property tax supplied by the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis). The summary
statistics of the data set are shown in table 1 and table 2.
4.1 Housing market data
Micro data on actual transactions in the housing market is considered to be the gold
standard for hedonic research. However, such information is not available at a large
scale for Germany. Instead we use data on asking prices scraped from online real estate
portals and provided to us by Empirica GmbH. This data is available from 2012 onwards
and covers all of Germany. As the state mandate for existing buildings was introduced
in 2010 this implies that our sample does not cover the period before and after it be-
came effective. Instead of comparing sales prices across time we therefore develop an
identification strategy based on location inside or outside the regulated state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg and building vintage as described further below. Our strategy has the
advantage that it does not require the housing market or in particular the hedonic func-
tion to be stable over time. In contrast to many other developed economies, Germany
has experienced a real estate boom starting in 2009, which makes the assumption of a
stable hedonic function over this period less likely to hold.
We have obtained data for the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg and the neighboring
states Hesse, Rheinland-Palatinate and Bavaria. Our sample covers houses in counties
(Landkreise) on both sides of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state border as shown in figure 1.
For the period from 2012 to 2014 we have a total of 56,678 houses offered for sale. We
reduce the data set by removing observations with missing information on important
characteristics as well as houses built before 1901, listed properties, or houses without
central heating. In addition we exclude houses posted online for more than a year,
houses with renewable heating systems that were built before 2009, and houses that
are connected to district heating.4 Furthermore, we remove observations with outlier
4We keep new homes with renewable heating in place in the sample. The share of renewables in
this building segment is high due to the federal building codes on renewable heating in new homes
(EEWaermeG). In our sample, renewable technologies are installed in about 60 % of the new buildings.
6
values (defined as observations that lie outside of the upper quartile by more than 1.5
times the interquartile range) on living space and number of rooms as well as the lower
and upper 0.5 % of the price offers. After data cleaning we are left with 32,586 unique
houses in the data set. The data includes a wide variety of characteristics such as size,
number of rooms, year of construction, main source of heating, quality of the house as
graded by Empirica GmbH and availability of a garden, etc. There is also information
on whether or not the house was refurbished after 2008 when the state mandate was
passed. However, we have no information about what the refurbishment consisted of
and whether the heating system was exchanged. We include the variable to control for
the fact that a change of heating system may have taken place for these houses and treat
them as a separate category. We thus have three classes of buildings: old (constructed
before 2009), new (built 2009 and later) and those refurbished after 2008. While the
data set does contain information on the location of the house offered for sale, this
information is generally limited to the centroid of the municipality or postal code area
in question.
Figure 1: Counties on both sides of the border of Baden-Wuerttemberg
Rhineland− 
 Palatinate
Hesse
Bavaria
Baden− 
 Wuerttemberg
Notes: The figure displays the counties on both sides of the red border of Baden-Wuerttemberg (bottom left) and
its neighbors (from the top left) Rheinland-Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria for which housing offers were collected.
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4.2 INKAR and Destatis
The INKAR data is provided by the German Federal Institute for Research on Building,
Urban Affairs and Spatial Development and available for download from www.inkar.de
(Indicators and maps of spatial and urban development). This data set consists of time
series on a wide variety of indicators, e.g. unemployment, tax revenues, age distribution
of the population, type of housing, etc. We use the most disaggregated level of informa-
tion available, which is at the level of the 4,567 municipalities or municipal associations
(Gemeindeverba¨nde). The real estate tax factor (Hebesatz ) is set at the municipal level
and determines the level of property tax paid by the owner together with the assessed
value of the plot (Einheitswert) and the type and value of construction (Grundsteuer-
messzahl). The tax factor varies substantially across municipalities as can be seen in
table 1. Income tax revenues relate to the share of income taxes appropriated to the
municipality, which is currently 12 % on capital income and 15 % for other forms of
income.
Variable Min Median Mean Max N
Price [EUR] 53,200 259,300 276,484 855,880 32,586
Space [sqm] 30 145 154 287 32,586
Year of construction 1901 1980 1980 2016 32,586
No. of rooms 1.00 5.00 5.66 10.00 32,586
Unemployment [%] 0.90 2.90 3.08 7.20 32,586
Income Tax Revenues [EUR per capita] 243 440 440 636 32,586
Real Estate Tax Factor [%] 150 350 352 800 32,586
Table 1: Summary statistics: Numeric variables
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for the numeric variables in our data set covering the period from
2012 to 2014. We excluded dwellings built prior to 1901 or listed homes as well as homes with missing information
on main characteristics. We also excluded homes posted for more than 12 months online. Furthermore, we
dropped houses with renewable heating systems that were built before 2009 or that are connected to district
heating. Finally we remove outlier values on living space and number of rooms as well as the lower and upper
0.5 % of the price offers.
8
Variable Mean N
Semi-detached house 0.173 5,643
1-family house 0.519 16,909
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house 0.060 1,947
Row house 0.122 3,962
2-family house 0.127 4,125
Garden (No) 0.370 12,066
Garden (Yes) 0.630 20,520
Simple equipment 0.043 1,387
Good equipment 0.398 12,953
High quality equipment 0.269 8,759
Normal equipment 0.291 9,487
Good building condition 0.451 14,701
Normal building condition 0.461 15,031
Variable Mean N
Bad building condition 0.088 2,854
Building projected (No) 0.844 27,516
Building projected (Yes) 0.156 5,070
Border Hesse 0.177 5,774
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.320 10,418
Border Bavaria 0.503 16,394
Outside Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.447 14,564
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.553 18,022
Not OLD 0.229 7,471
OLD 0.771 25,115
No refurbishment after 2008 0.936 30,499
Refurbishment after 2008 0.064 2,087
Table 2: Summary statistics: Categorical variables
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for the categorical variables in our data set covering the period
from 2012 to 2014. We excluded dwellings built prior to 1901 or listed homes as well as homes with missing
information on main characteristics. We also excluded homes posted for more than 12 months online. Furthermore,
we dropped houses with renewable heating systems that were built before 2009 or that are connected to district
heating. Finally we remove outlier values on living space and number of rooms as well as the lower and upper
0.5 % of the price offers.
5 Empirical strategy: Difference-in-Differences Nearest
Neighbor Matching
We utilize differences in the coverage of the state mandate to identify the potential
effect on housing prices adapting an approach developed in Haninger et al. (2017) in
the context of brownfield remediation. In particular, homes constructed after 1 January
2009, in all German states were subject to the federal Renewable Energies Heat Act
requiring a minimum use of renewable heating technologies. In contrast, only in the state
of Baden-Wuerttemberg are homes built before that date subject to a state mandate on
renewable heating in existing buildings. We identify an effect on housing prices by
analyzing differences in housing prices across the state border between new and existing
buildings.
We write the hedonic price function to explain prices Pitk as a function of the home’s
covariates Xitk where indexes refer to: i (house), t (year) and k (border segment defined
by neighboring state). Some of the homes are built before 2009 (OLDik = 1) and some
are built after (OLDik = 0). Furthermore, we have a third category, namely homes
built before 2009, but which underwent a refurbishment after 2008 (Refurbishment(>
2008)ik = 1). Similarly, some homes are located in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg
(BWik = 1) and some are located outside (BWik = 0). We model the house charac-
teristics, including refurbishment status, using a flexible function f(Xitk; θt). For those
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homes, that are built before 2009 and located in Baden-Wuerttemberg we expect to find
an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), pit, of the state mandate if one exists:
Pitk = β0t + β1tOLDik + β2tBWik + pitOLDik ×BWik + f(Xitk; θt) + uitk. (1)
A goal of this estimation procedure is to cancel out the effect of the flexible function
of a home’s characteristics so that this function does not have to be estimated. The
procedure is based on (bias-corrected) matching and requires two steps:
In the first step consider all homes built before 2009 (OLDik = 1), which include
also homes that were refurbished after 2008:
Pitk = (β0t + β1t) + (β2t + pit)BWik + f(Xitk; θt) + uitk. (2)
Each home in Baden-Wuerttemberg (BWik = 1) is matched to a set of J control
homes in the neighboring state using genetic matching (cf. Diamond and Sekhon, 2013).
For each of the treatment homes, a counterfactual is constructed based on the matched
controls (i.e. a weighted average of the price of each of the J control homes, P
(itk)
j ).
Based on the counterfactual, an individual treatment effect for each treatment home can
be calculated and stored in the vector POLDt of length Nt corresponding to the number
of old homes in Baden-Wuerttemberg in year t. The average treatment effect for all old
homes is given by:
(β2t + pit) =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(
Pitk − 1
J
J∑
j=1
P
(itk)
j
)
. (3)
Now consider all homes built after 2009 (OLDik = 0):
Pitk = β0t + β2tBWik + f(Xitk; θt) + uitk. (4)
Following the same procedure described above with matching each of the homes in
Baden-Wuerttemberg to a new home outside delivers a set of individual treatment effects
stored in the vector PNEWt of length N˜t and an average treatment effect:
β2t =
1
N˜t
N˜t∑
i=1
(
P˜itk − 1
J
J∑
j=1
P˜
(itk)
j
)
.
We need to further correct for potential bias in the first-stage estimates. This is particu-
larly important given that our treated and control homes are always located in different
municipalities, i.e. we need to correct for characteristics of these municipalities that
differ such as the real estate tax factor, etc. As in Haninger et al. (2017) we apply the
bias-corrected matching estimator from Abadie and Imbens (2011). The details on the
implementation of this approach are found in Appendix A.1.
In the second step the ATT for each year is recovered by simply differencing the
average treatments from the first step:
pit =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(
Pitk − 1
J
J∑
j=1
P
(itk)
j
)
− 1
N˜t
N˜t∑
i=1
(
P˜itk − 1
J
J∑
j=1
P˜
(itk)
j
)
, (5)
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where the first and the second term correspond to the average treatment effect for old
homes, POLD,bcmit , and for new homes, P
NEW,bcm
it , respectively. In other words, it is
a bias-corrected Difference-in-Differences estimator utilizing variation across the state
borders and home vintages. The difference between the prices of new homes in Baden-
Wuerttemberg and neighboring states should capture state specific factors such as e.g.
the property transfer tax which differ between states and are likely to capitalize into
prices. The difference between the prices of old homes in Baden-Wuerttemberg and the
neighboring states should capture these factors as well as the effect of the state mandate
on renewable heating. Therefore differencing the two differences isolates the effect of the
renewable heating mandate.
The bias-corrected Difference-in-Differences estimator does not directly account for
differences in the individual house vintages. In particular, it does not easily allow us
to control for refurbishment status after the state mandate was introduced. To this
purpose we also estimate a simple linear model where we regress the bias-corrected esti-
mates P bcmt on an indicator for construction prior to 2009, matching covariates including
refurbishment status and control for municipality fixed effects (νr):
P bcmt = pitOLDi +Xitk δt + νr + itk. (6)
As a final robustness check, we also estimate a standard cross-sectional hedonic
regression with spatial fixed effects in which we specifically model f(Xitk; θt) from equa-
tion 1.
Our research design is potentially vulnerable to spillover effects: As demand for older
homes affected by the mandate declines along the border within Baden-Wuerttemberg
demand for substitutes in the neighboring states could increase. This would lead us to
overstate the average impact on prices in comparison to capitalization for homes further
from the border where substitutes are not available. Our estimates may therefore be
seen as an upper bound on the capitalization of the private cost of the mandate.
6 Results
In this section we first describe briefly the procedure used to match houses on either
side of the Baden-Wuerttemberg border. We then describe in detail our findings based
on the two difference-in-differences approaches described above. The robustness check
using a more standard hedonic framework is found in the appendix.
6.1 Matching
To control for differences in observable characteristics we use the method of genetic
matching as developed by Diamond and Sekhon (2013) and match on several housing
characteristics: garden availability, quality indicators (condition, furnishing class), num-
ber of rooms, living space and year of construction. At the municipal level we include
information on unemployment, income tax revenues and the real estate tax factor. We
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match exactly on housing type (detached house, row house, etc.) as well as the federal
border segment to ensure spatial proximity of treatment and control houses. We also
match exactly with regard to homes undergoing refurbishment after 2008 and, for new
buildings, whether they are projected. Finally, the propensity score estimated based
on the same variables is included in the algorithm. The genetic matching algorithm
comprises both Mahalanobis matching and propensity score matching and the weights
determine the extent to which each approach influences the outcome. We match houses
within and outside of Baden-Wuerttemberg for each calendar year separately. We match
with replacement each treated house with two control houses (J = 2). QQ-plots from our
matching procedure can be found in the appendix. They show that matching improves
the balance in covariates significantly across the board.
2012
Old - BW New - BW Total BW Old - Non BW New - Non BW
All 4,717 1,443 6,160 3,976 1,154
Matched 4,705 1,437 6,142 2,523 696
Unmatched 12 6 18 1,453 458
2013
Old - BW New - BW Total BW Old - Non BW New - Non BW
All 4,487 1,323 5,810 3,492 1,042
Matched 4,483 1,314 5,797 2,260 659
Unmatched 4 9 13 1,232 383
2014
Old - BW New - BW Total BW Old - Non BW New - Non BW
All 4,629 1,423 6,052 3,814 1,086
Matched 4,620 1,410 6,030 2,763 663
Unmatched 9 13 22 1,051 423
Table 3: Genetic matching: Overview by year of sale
Notes: The table shows the number of observations by category (new/old) and location within or outside Baden-
Wuerttemberg in the full and matched samples, as well as the number of observations not matched.
The number of observations in the full and matched samples is shown in table 3 and
the spatial distribution in figure 2. Old houses (incl. refurbished) are red or blue de-
pending on their location within and outside Baden-Wuerttemberg, whereas new homes
are orange or green. The matched sample is distributed along both sides of the state
border without any obvious gaps or clusterings.
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Figure 2: Matched sample, old and new houses on both sides of the border
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Notes: The figure displays the matched sample of houses. Points showing old houses are red/blue while new houses
are orange/green depending on location inside or outside Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW). A point corresponds to the
centroid of the municipality in which the house is located.
6.2 Capitalization of the state mandate into prices
The main findings from the estimations of equation 5 and equation 6 are displayed in
table 4 in panels a) and b) respectively. Panel a) shows the differences in means between
the price differences of old and new buildings (equation 5). In panel b), we regress the
price differences that we obtained in the first step on an indicator for old homes, the
matching covariates, and include municipality fixed effects (equation 6).
We find no significant effect of the mandate in the first specification based on the
means of the bias-adjusted estimates as well as in the second panel with the regression
corrected results. Furthermore, we fail to reject that the coefficients for old buildings
are equal to the ones for buildings that underwent a refurbishment after 2008.
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(1) (2) (3)
2012 2013 2014
a) Mean Difference 0.0082 −0.0143 0.0175
t-Statistic 0.4767 −0.7934 0.9787
b) OLD 0.0005 0.0319 0.0092
(0.0209) (0.0234) (0.0257)
Refurbishment(>2008) −0.0055 0.0004 0.0258
(0.0241) (0.0278) (0.0270)
Observations 6,115 5,768 6,009
Adj. R2 0.2108 0.2390 0.2188
Notes: The upper part of the table (panel a) reports the difference in means across
bias-corrected estimates from the first stage and the corresponding t-statistic for the
three different years. The lower part of the table (panel b) shows the results for the
dummy variable of “OLD” and “Refurbishment(> 2008)”, while controlling for a
set of individual housing characteristics and municipality fixed effects for the three
different years (2012-2014). Each year is estimated in a separate regression. The
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered on municipality level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4: Results: DD-NNM
7 Discussion
What factors may explain the fact that we find no significant evidence of capitalization
of the state mandate in the housing market? The fact that we base our analysis on
asking prices may raise the question whether sellers are responsive to concerns regarding
energy costs. Given the scarcity of transactions data for Germany, Frondel et al. (2018)
also use asking prices for their study of the impact of mandatory disclosure of energy
performance for housing. For a subsample of observations in Berlin, they are able to
obtain transaction prices as well and compare list and transaction prices. They find a
small but relatively constant difference between the two over time. The introduction
of mandatory energy performance certificates does not seem to affect this gap. While
this result may be specific to the Berlin subsample for which both types of data were
available, it does provide us with some confidence that our findings are relevant to the
realized prices in the housing market as well. Moreover, the fact that Frondel et al.
(2018) do find effects on the asking prices suggests that sellers are aware of the saliency
of a house’s energy performance for buyers. Their study focuses on the period 2013-2015
which overlaps with our time frame.
Given that sellers are indeed responsive to energy costs, why do we find little evi-
dence of capitalization? One explanation may be that the state mandate is not well-
known among sellers. Whereas buyers have a strong incentive to investigate potential
retrofitting costs, the same may not hold for sellers. They may be less aware of current
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legal requirements as a result. Alternatively, it may be that the pending revision of
the 2008 state mandate led to uncertainty about the stringency of the mandate in the
future. While the final revision increases the share of renewable energy from 10 to 15 %,
it also introduces several additional compliance measures some of which are very low
cost. An official paper revealed several elements of the revision in 2013 with resulting
critical news paper coverage including headlines such as “The intention alone counts”
(Die Absicht alleine za¨hlt, Zeitung fu¨r den Energiemarkt, 2013). The expectation that
the revised mandate may be more lenient could have reduced pressure on sellers to lower
their asking price.
The rising share of the use of bio-gas and bio-oil for compliance with the mandate
may also explain why we find no significant evidence of capitalization. One of the effects
of the state mandate has likely been to increase the supply of bio-gas on offer from
gas providers in Baden-Wuerttemberg: Bernauer and Reisch (2018) study the structure
of tariffs offered for gas across Germany in 2017 and find that whereas at a national
level 20 % of gas suppliers offer a bio-gas tariff, almost half of these suppliers were
located in Baden-Wuerttemberg with the remaining companies spread equally among
the other 15 German states. In fact they found that 97 % of the gas companies in
Baden-Wuerttemberg offered a bio-gas product. While they have no historical data it
seems likely that this supply effect may be associated with the state mandate.
Finally, our analysis only recovers the immediate effect on asking prices. If the
mandate indeed causes a reduction in retrofitting activities in the state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, it could be that over time the quality of the housing stock declines,
which in itself could cause lower prices. Such an effect would likely take several years to
manifest itself however, and we would not identify it within the period covered by the
present analysis.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we study the effect of a state mandate on renewable energy for heating
on the housing market. We construct a research design based on the spatial disconti-
nuity at the state border and taking advantage of the variation in applicability of the
mandate by building vintage. Specifically, we estimate a spatial difference-in-differences
model comparing the prices of old and new houses for sale within and outside of Baden-
Wuerttemberg. This design allows us to identify effects on the asking prices of houses
for sale in the existing building stock in Baden-Wuerttemberg.
We find no significant evidence of capitalization of the mandate into asking prices
in the housing market. We speculate that our finding may be due to a) low salience of
the mandate among sellers, b) the expected revision of the state law, which happened
in 2015 and introduced more flexibility and additional compliance measures of lower
costs, and c) the increased availability of low cost compliance measures in the shape
of bio-gas and bio-oil. If the latter explanation is true, our findings suggest that the
15
financial burden associated with the mandate is small. On the other hand, if retrofitting
activity in Baden-Wuerttemberg has declined in consequence of the state mandate a cost
in terms of declining quality of the housing stock may emerge over time.
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A Appendix
A.1 Bias-correction
We apply the bias-corrected matching estimator from Abadie and Imbens (2011). To
this purpose we define the conditional expected price of a home in Baden-Wuerttemberg
given its attributes had it been located in the neighboring state instead as µ0(Xitk):
µ0(Xitk) = E[P
0
itk | Xitk]. (7)
The conditional expected price is approximated using a linear model:
µˆ0(Xjtk) = Xjtk θˆw=0, (8)
where θw=0 is estimated using weighted OLS based on the all control homes in the
matched sample and the weight is given by the frequency with which the home is used
as a match. With the estimated θˆw=0 in hand, the conditionally expected price of homes
within Baden-Wuerttemberg is predicted:
µˆ0(Xitk) = Xitk θˆw=0. (9)
The bias-adjusted matching estimator (Pˆ (itk)) amends the simple matching estimator
P (itk) by including the correction terms above:
POLD,bcmi,t = Pitk −
1
J
J∑
j=1
Pˆ
(itk)
j ,
replacing Pˆ (itk) by its parts:
POLD,bcmi,t = Pitk −
( 1
J
J∑
j=1
P
(itk)
j + µˆ0(Xitk)− µˆ0(Xjtk)
)
.
A similar procedure is used to recover bias-corrected estimates of the treatment effect
for new homes, PNEW,bcmi,t . All estimates are then stacked into the vector P
bcm
t of length
Nt + N˜t.
A.2 Genetic matching
To control for differences in observable characteristics we use the method of genetic
matching as developed by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). It is a form of nearest neigh-
bor Mahalanobis distance matching with replacement and weighting of the individual
variables:
GMD(Xi, Xj ,W ) =
√
(Xi −Xj)T (S−1/2)T W S−1/2 (Xi −Xj)).
The weights W of covariates X are determined by minimizing a loss function to achieve
covariate balance. Our loss function is defined as the largest individual discrepancy
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based on p-values from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in distributions and
paired t-tests for each variable.
In addition to QQ-plots, we compute standardized mean differences, i.e. the differ-
ence from treated and untreated houses divided by the standard deviation of the treated
houses, on all matching variables, which can be found in the appendix. Matching reduces
these differences for almost all variables in all years and for new and old houses. Al-
though this result becomes evident from the alignment in distributions between treated
and control houses as shown by the QQ-plots, the mean values may provide a quick
assessment of the improvements. Furthermore, the standardized mean differences illus-
trate that characteristics in the sample may vary over year, underlining the importance
to analyze the years separately.
The summary statistics for the matched sample pooled across all three years are
shown in tables 5 and 6. The sample characteristics are very similar for the matched
sample compared to the full sample characteristics shown above.
Variable Min Median Mean Max N
Price [EUR] 53,200 265,000 281,144 855,880 27,533
Space [sqm] 30 146 155 287 27,533
Year of construction 1901 1980 1981 2016 27,533
No. of rooms 1.00 5.50 5.71 10.00 27,533
Unemployment [%] 1.00 2.80 2.97 7.20 27,533
Income Tax Revenues [EUR per capita] 260 447 447 636 27,533
Real Estate Tax Factor [%] 200 350 353 800 27,533
Table 5: Genetic matching: Summary statistics: Numeric variables
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for the numerical variables describing the matched sample when
pooled for all three years. A comparison to table 1 reveals only very minor changes in the sample summary
statistics.
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Variable Mean N
Semi-detached house 0.183 5,039
1-family house 0.499 13,733
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house 0.061 1,688
Row house 0.126 3,467
2-family house 0.131 3,606
Garden (No) 0.368 10,126
Garden (Yes) 0.632 17,407
Simple equipment 0.040 1,094
Good equipment 0.397 10,937
High quality equipment 0.268 7,383
Normal equipment 0.295 8,119
Good building condition 0.444 12,236
Normal building condition 0.470 12,950
Variable Mean N
Bad building condition 0.085 2,347
Building projected (No) 0.849 23,387
Building projected (Yes) 0.151 4,146
Border Hesse 0.165 4549
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.325 8,945
Border Bavaria 0.510 14,039
Outside BW 0.347 9,564
BW 0.653 17,969
Not OLD 0.224 6,179
OLD 0.776 21,354
No refurbishment after 2008 0.936 25,774
Refurbishment after 2008 0.064 1,759
Table 6: Genetic matching: Summary statistics: Categorical variables
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for the categorical variables describing the matched sample when
pooled over all three years. A comparison to table 2 reveals only very minor changes in the sample summary
statistics.
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A.3 QQ-plots: New houses
Figure 3: QQ-Plots: Treatment and control new houses in all four states: 2012
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for new houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2012.
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Figure 4: QQ-Plots: Treatment and control new houses in all four states: 2013
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for new houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2013.
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Figure 5: QQ-Plots: Treatment and control new houses in all four states: 2014
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for new houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2014.
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A.4 QQ-plots: Old houses
Figure 6: QQ-Plots: Treatment and control old houses in all four states: 2012
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for old houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2012.
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Figure 7: QQ-Plots: Treatment and control old houses in all four states: 2013
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for old houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2013.
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Figure 8: QQ-Plots: Treatment and control old houses in all four states: 2014
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for old houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2014.
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Notes: Based on own computations. The figure shows the quantile-quantile (QQ) plots for the different matching
variables in the original and matched sample for old houses in the four states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland
Palatinate, Hesse and Bavaria) for the year 2014.
A.5 Standardized mean differences: New houses
Variable All Matched
Semi-detached house 0.1148 0.0000
1-family house −0.1466 0.0000
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house −0.0470 0.0000
Row house 0.1066 0.0000
2-family house −0.0382 0.0000
Garden (Yes) 0.2059 0.0130
Good equipment −0.0370 −0.0194
High quality equipment 0.1301 0.0069
Normal equipment −0.0896 0.0105
Normal building condition 0.0263 0.0264
Building projected (Yes) 0.0117 0.0000
Variable All Matched
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.3293 0.0000
Border Bavaria −0.1544 0.0000
log(Space) 0.1070 0.0746
log(Construction year) −0.1165 −0.0437
log(No. rooms) 0.1698 0.0251
Unemployment −0.2778 −0.0223
Income tax revenues 0.4265 0.1191
Real estate tax factor 0.3944 0.2371
Refurbisment after 2008 NaN NaN
Propensity score 1.0181 0.3108
Table 7: Standardized mean differences for new houses - 2012
Notes: The table shows the standardized mean differences for the full and matched sample for new houses in the
year 2012.
33
Variable All Matched
Semi-detached house 0.0162 0.0000
1-family house −0.0604 0.0000
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house −0.0172 0.0000
Row house 0.0849 0.0000
2-family house −0.0013 0.0000
Garden (Yes) 0.0950 −0.0289
Good equipment −0.0569 −0.0653
High quality equipment 0.1448 0.0539
Normal equipment −0.0703 0.0236
Normal building condition 0.0408 0.0638
Building projected (Yes) 0.0584 0.0000
Variable All Matched
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.3840 0.0000
Border Bavaria −0.3944 0.0000
log(Space) 0.1662 0.0762
log(Construction year) 0.0382 −0.0343
log(No. rooms) 0.1356 0.0962
Unemployment 0.0211 0.0405
Income tax revenues 0.4999 0.0023
Real estate tax factor 0.2071 0.1944
Refurbisment after 2008 NaN NaN
Propensity score 0.7990 0.1257
Table 8: Standardized mean differences for new houses - 2013
Notes: The table shows the standardized mean differences for the full and matched sample for new houses in the
year 2013.
Variable All Matched
Semi-detached house 0.2157 0.0000
1-family house −0.3082 0.0000
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house 0.0722 0.0000
Row house 0.0769 0.0000
2-family house 0.0687 0.0000
Garden (Yes) 0.1938 0.0394
Good equipment −0.0510 0.0048
High quality equipment 0.1379 −0.0286
Normal equipment 0.0247 −0.0016
Normal building condition 0.0231 0.0676
Bad building condition NaN NaN
Building projected (Yes) −0.0294 0.0000
Variable All Matched
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.421 0.0000
Border Bavaria −0.5319 0.0000
log(Space) 0.0512 0.0501
log(Construction year) 0.0557 −0.0294
log(No. rooms) 0.0551 0.0184
Unemployment 0.3303 0.0956
Income tax revenues 0.4928 0.1206
Real estate tax factor 0.0549 −0.0046
Refurbisment after 2008 0.0375 0.0000
Propensity score 0.7958 0.0645
Table 9: Standardized mean differences for new houses - 2014
Notes: The table shows the standardized mean differences for the full and matched sample for new houses in the
year 2014.
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A.6 Standardized mean differences: Old houses
Variable All Matched
Semi-detached house 0.0984 0.0000
1-family house −0.1964 0.0000
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house 0.0070 0.0000
Row house 0.0804 0.0000
2-family house 0.0858 0.0000
Garden (Yes) −0.0335 −0.0468
Good equipment −0.0149 −0.0423
High quality equipment −0.0486 0.0197
Normal equipment 0.0650 0.0019
Normal building condition 0.0283 −0.0033
Bad building condition −0.0229 0.0543
Building projected (Yes) 0.0291 0.0000
Variable All Matched
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.1420 0.0000
Border Bavaria −0.1104 0.0000
log(Space) 0.1211 −0.0122
log(Construction year) 0.0556 −0.0511
log(No. rooms) 0.1720 0.0035
Unemployment −0.2442 0.0553
Income tax revenues 0.5126 0.0241
Real estate tax factor 0.2712 0.2390
Refurbishment after 2008 0.0057 0.0000
Propensity score 0.7944 0.1769
Table 10: Standardized mean differences for old houses - 2012
Notes: The table shows the standardized mean differences for the full and matched sample for old houses in the
year 2012.
Variable All Matched
Semi-detached house 0.1055 0.0000
1-family house −0.1456 0.0000
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house −0.0001 0.0000
Row house 0.0690 0.0000
2-family house 0.0268 0.0000
Garden (Yes) −0.0690 −0.0292
Good equipment 0.0091 −0.0160
High quality equipment −0.0800 −0.0570
Normal equipment 0.0723 0.0463
Normal building condition 0.1211 −0.0137
Bad building condition −0.0604 0.0124
Building projected (Yes) 0.0011 0.0000
Variable All Matched
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.1619 0.0000
Border Bavaria −0.0914 0.0000
log(Space) 0.0611 −0.0232
log(Construction year) 0.0379 −0.0663
log(No. rooms) 0.1311 0.0005
Unemployment −0.2094 0.0609
Income tax revenues 0.5497 0.0463
Real estate tax factor 0.1178 0.1334
Refurbishment after 2008 −0.0214 0.0000
Propensity score 0.7209 0.1010
Table 11: Standardized mean differences for old houses - 2013
Notes: The table shows the standardized mean differences for the full and matched sample for old houses in the
year 2013.
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Variable All Matched
Semi-detached house 0.1148 0.0000
1-family house −0.1881 0.0000
Unsp. 1- or 2-family house 0.0023 0.0000
Row house 0.1001 0.0000
2-family house 0.0423 0.0000
Garden (Yes) −0.0501 −0.0820
Good equipment 0.0515 −0.0095
High quality equipment −0.0821 0.0010
Normal equipment 0.0414 −0.0099
Normal building condition 0.1025 0.0058
Bad building condition −0.0625 0.0152
Building projected (Yes) 0.0322 0.0000
Variable All Matched
Border Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0783 0.0000
Border Bavaria −0.0214 0.0000
log(Space) 0.0755 0.0215
log(Construction year) 0.0464 −0.0303
log(No. rooms) 0.1646 0.0599
Unemployment −0.1398 0.0766
Income tax revenues 0.5047 0.2162
Real estate tax factor 0.0126 0.0422
Refurbishment after 2008 0.0024 0.0000
Propensity score 0.6404 0.2421
Table 12: Standardized mean differences for old houses - 2014
Notes: The table shows the standardized mean differences for the full and matched sample for old houses in the
year 2014.
A.7 Robustness check: standard hedonic regression
The results of estimating the hedonic regression in equation 1 without matching and the
two step procedure are found in table 13.5 We show only the coefficients for our variables
of interest. The remaining coefficients show the expected signs for size of living area,
number of rooms, etc. and are available from the authors upon request. Compared to
the second panel of our main findings, the results do not provide evidence for a negative
impact of the state mandate on prices of affected houses. On the contrary, we find a
(weakly) significant positive effect of the state mandate on housing prices in 2012 (at the
10 % level) and 2013. These regressions are based on the full data set without genetic
matching, which may give rise to biased estimates. In particular, old houses in Baden-
Wuerttemberg in the full sample are typically located in more prosperous municipalities
(higher income tax revenues), have more rooms and have more living space compared
to old houses outside of Baden-Wuerttemberg.6 All these factors are positively related
with house prices and may cast doubt on whether these houses are experiencing similar
trends.7 In the matched samples, these differences are reduced substantially.
5Given the different procedures, the dependent variable in table 13 is the price of the respective
house, whereas the dependent variable in panel b) in table 4 is the price difference of houses in Baden-
Wuerttemberg to their matched counterparts outside of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
6The standardized mean differences for these comparisons can be found in appendix A.6.
7Even if we control for these variables in a linear way and including municipality fixed effects, there
could be influences that are not captured since the exact formulation of the flexible function in equation 1
is unknown.
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(1) (2) (3)
2012 2013 2014
BW x OLD 0.0238* 0.0347** −0.0036
(0.0142) (0.0147) (0.0159)
BW x Refurbishment(>2008) 0.0104 0.0550** 0.0064
(0.0247) (0.0262) (0.0232)
Observations 12,116 11,125 11,792
Adj. R2 0.6382 0.6523 0.6400
Notes: The table shows the results for the interaction variable of “BW” with “OLD”
and “Refurbishment(> 2008)”, respectively, while controlling for a set of individual
housing characteristics and municipality fixed effects for the three different years
(2012-2014). Each year is estimated in a separate regression and using the full data
set for the given year. The standard errors are in parentheses and clustered on
municipality level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 13: Results: Standard hedonic regression
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